It was exactly fifty years but five days ago that I had talks in New York at the United Nations on behalf of the revolutionary Imre Nagy government. More precisely I met the secretary general, Dag Hammarskjöld. I, myself, was not a personal envoy of the prime minister; I was merely 21 years of age, a student. The delegation was headed by a minister of the government, Anna Kéthly. I became a member of the delegation after having been elected by the revolutionary student organisation in Sopron, after the Soviet Union, defying all existing agreements, launched an attack against Hungary and against the legitimate Hungarian government. Only a few days earlier the governments of the two countries have agreed that the Soviet troops, which have been stationed there based on the Warsaw Pact, would leave the country within a few weeks. Instead, at four o’clock on the fourth of November tanks began flooding the country from everywhere, artillery was taking up new positions and the air force carried out air raids.
The government and prime minister Imre Nagy had no option but to – and I quote: ‘tell the people of the country and the world public’ that the country would leave the Warsaw Pact and deploy a delegation to the United Nations in the hope that other people would look on passively while a nation was being treaded on.
The delegation arrived to New York on the fifth of November, 1956, but the general secretary only met the delegation on the 8th of November. I was of the view at that time that three days were wasted, because I thought the blue helmets of the UN could be set up within days and could be soon deployed. That should have been necessary.
The country lived in complete isolation at that time. I knew, that there was such a thing, called United Nations, maybe I even had an idea of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Like many people of my age and citizenship, I had no way of knowing however, that the right of veto could practically prevent everything in the council, and that exactly this right of veto was exercised by the Soviet Union, whose military manoeuvres should have been halted. Nor did I know that the other council members were not interested in thoroughly solving the issue soon, either. All these facts were far beyond the grasp of someone just 21 years young, and from behind the iron curtain.
Finally, the meeting of the delegation with the Secretary General took place on the 8th of November. When the meeting started, my back was heavily sweating; I think I can recall the feeling.
The Secretary General started listing his arguments, how much the United Nations Organisation has already done for Hungary, that it started collecting aid, that the shipments of the Red Cross have reached Hungary, that he has sent a High Commissioner for Refugees to Vienna … and at that point I interrupted.
- We are indeed thankful to the United Nations for all these measures, but this is not the main issue, something else is at stake. The survival of Hungary is what needs support. It is not only a question of refugees, Hungary still exists, but it is threatened in its existence.
I got a smile instead of an answer.
Even if that smile has not smashed a world of ideals in me, it has ruined a hastily built house of hope, which was about to open its doors and windows towards freedom. Certainly we were responsible for our hopes, I myself as much as my friends, or, the prime minister and the state minister heading the delegation to the same degree. We were all responsible for having believed.
Whom we believed?
It would be a commonplace to refer to the forces of history, a given geopolitical situation, an international constellation, or anything else. It is not a commonplace, however, to recall that this hope of ours, – no matter how doomed it was from the start – was strengthened by certain radio stations abroad. The greater was my disappointment, and not only mine, also that of my friends, and the government.
Many of us are still convinced that as a minimal gesture, neutrality as declared by the legitimate Hungarian government should have been accepted by – if not the Security Council – than by the General Assembly. At that time the block of neutral countries was quite numerous, even if they were rather varied in their way of thinking, but similar in their foreign policy and international stature. Some of them just wanted to stay away from one or another military block, but there were others, which wanted to stay equally far from the two big camps, the eastern bloc headed by the Soviet Union and the grouping around the United Nations. Austria won back its unique neutrality in 1955. The same year, in April the memorable Bandung Conference was held, with 29 countries from Asia and Africa. Of course, I know that 30 countries could not have possibly determined the will of the General Assembly. I am also aware that information available in many countries about Hungary and the Hungarian revolution was rather scarce, faulty and biased, to say the least, the only exception being Austria in this respect. However I believe it could have really changed the situation, and would have changed our thinking, if this group of countries had dared to take another stand, to halt the invasion, and provide an alternative solution of the situation. And I am only talking about accepting the neutrality declared by the government.
It could have been halted; it could have been oriented towards another solution. I know. Next year, as a student organisation envoy, I visited South-East-Asian countries and attended international conferences. I saw what an immense fear and how great nervousness it had evoked, when an international forum, an international student organisation, or the international student solidarity reminded the world what 1956 was. That it was not restoration of the old regime, not a reactionary u-turn, was not about revising the post-war world order, but it was about reforming and reshaping the existing socialist social-solidarity order of society. It was also about a neutral foreign policy open towards all directions.
But I as a witness of the times should not only complain: already in November 1956 the secretary General has set up an inquiry committee with the Danish diplomat, Povl Bang Jensen as its secretary. The committee heard a great number of witnesses, carefully weighing the credibility and trustworthiness of the testimonies, and compiled a report. Probably this report describes the 1956 Hungarian revolution best, and this report was put on the agenda of the United Nations taking up the Hungarian Issue as late as in 1959. In the meantime the prime minister and some of his associates were executed in 1958, and in November Poll Bang Jensen was found dead with a bullet in his head in New York.
Conclusion?
There is no conclusion. I can only quote a well-known Hungarian writer, Tibor Déry who wrote an article during the days of the revolution, entitled: No acquittal. There is none. Not to anyone, including myself. But, there is no verdict, either, to use another quote from Déry. History is a given course of events. Only those participating in the events should moralise. Historians should not.
And what is the moral?
The moral, if at all, is that diplomats and international organisations should recognise, that the events - especially the ones happening in those tiny, defenceless countries – are not always guided by principles, which can be agreed or not, – but are carried out by everyday people, who have their sorrows and happiness, a life they may not be able to live. Their cry for help resembles the gesture of the man drowning in water stretching his hands towards his saviour.
Thank you.